

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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R 271815Z JAN 77
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1399
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 0471

EXDIS

LONDON PLEASE PASS VICE PRESIDENT'S PARTY.

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: NATO, PFOR, TU, GR
SUBJ: TURKISH PERMREP'S CONVERSATION WITH SYG LUNS, JANUARY 24

REF: ANKARA549 (DTG 251425Z JAN 77)

1. THERE FOLLOWS INFORMAL MISSION TRANSLATION OF
"TALKING POINTS" GIVEN BY TURKISH AMBASSADOR KIRCA
TO SYG LUNS JUST PRIOR TO THE VISIT OF VICE PRESIDENT
MONDALE ON JANUARY 24. TURKISH DCM PROVIDED US
WITH A COPY OF THIS PAPER, ASKED THAT IT BE
BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF AMBASSADOR STRAUSZ-HUPE,
AND NOTED THAT OTHER PERMREPS ARE NOT BEING INFORMED
OF THE EXISTENCE OF THIS PAPER.

2. SALIENT POINTS IN THE TURKISH PAPER ARE: (A) AN
AFFIRMATION THAT REFUSAL BY THE US TO RATIFY THE
DCA WITH TURKEY OR ATTACHMENT OF POLITICAL CONDITIONS OT RAFIF-
ICATION, WOULD LEAD TO THE IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE OF AMERICAN
PERSONNEL FROM JOINT DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS IN TURKEY, AND THE
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FINAL CLOSING OF THESE INSTALLATIONS, AND ALSO OBLIGE TURKEY TO
REVISE ITS DEFENSE EFFORTS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF NATO'S INTE-
GRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE; (B) TURKEY IS CONSCIOUS OF THE NEEDED
TO SOLVE THE CYPRUS QUESTION AND WILL NOT ACCEPT TO BE TREATED BY
ITS MOST POWERFUL ALLY AS AN OPPRESSOR OR CONQUEROR IN CYPRUS;
AND (C) LUNS SHOULD TELL THE VICE PRESIDENT THAT PRIME MINISTER
DEMIREL IS PREPARED TO AID CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS TO THE LIMIT
OF HIS ABILITY AND THAT HE WULL SPARE NO EFFORT TO FIND A
JUST AND HONORABLE SOLUTION ON CYPRUS IF HE WINS THE 1977
ELECTIONS.

3. COMMENT: WE NOTE REPORT IN REFTTEL OF A JANUARY 25 ARTICLE IN THE TURKISH PRESS, DATED IN BRUSSELS, THAT CITES "NATO OFFICIALS" AS SAYING THAT TURKISH NATO AMBASSADOR PASSED A MESSAGE FROM ANKARA TO SYG LUNS FOR TRANSMITTAL TO THE VICE PRESIDENT GIVING SOME OF THE FLAVOR OF THE MESSAGE WHILE WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE ON WHO MAY HAVE BRIEFED TURKISH CORRESPONDENT ON THIS MATTER, LOGICAL ASSUMPTION IS THE TURKISH DELEGATION DID SO ON INSTRUCTIONS AND THAT ANKARA WANTED THIS MESSAGE TO HAVE A PUBLIC RESONANCE IN TURKEY. END COMMENT.

4. BEGIN TEXT:

CONVERSATION NOTES OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TURKEY WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, 24 JANUARY 1977

1. I HAVE COME TO SEE YOU ON THE INSTRUCTIONS OF MY PRIME MINISTER AND MY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

2. MR. CARTER, DURING HIS ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN, MADE STATEMENTS THAT WERE RATHER PRO-GREEK; THESE STATEMENTS, ALTHOUGH VAGUE, WERE NONETHELESS DISTURBING. TURKEY, WITHOUT LOSING ITS COOLNESS AND ITS DIGNITY, DID NOT RE-
ACT TO THESE STATEMENTS. AFTER HIS ELECTION, MR. CARTER DOUBTLESS WISHED TO REVERSE THE TREND SOMEWHAT WITH HIS MUCH MORE OBJECTIVE
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AND REALISTIC STATEMENT OF 1 DECEMBER 1976. THIS STATEMENT ADVOCATED THE SIMULTANEOUS RATIFICATION OF THE DEFENSE AGREEMENTS WITH GREECE AND TURKEY BY THE AMERICAN CONGRESS. IN THIS LAST STATEMENT, MR. CARTER ALSO SPOKE OF THE CYPRUS QUESTION AND OF THE GRECO-TURK DISPUTE IN GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE TERMS. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT KNOW AT THIS MOMENT WHETHER OR NOT MR. CARTER WILL RECOMMEND TO THE CONGRESS THE ASSOCIATION OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE TURKISH-AMERICAN AGREEMENT WITH CERTAIN POLITICAL CONDITIONS RELATIVE TO SETTLING THE CYPRUS CONFLICT. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT MUST NOT BE FORGOTTEN THAT THIS LAST STATEMENT IS ALSO NOT OF A NATURE TO TIE DOWN THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION SINCE IT WAS MADE PRIOR TO THE TRANSFER OF POWER ON 20 JANUARY AND RE-EXAMINATION OF AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD THESE PROBLEMS WILL BEGIN IN THE DAYS TO COME.

3. AS FOR THE TURKISH-AMERICAN DEFENSE AGREEMENT, THE TURKISH POSITION REMAINS UNCHANGED. THE TURKISH PEOPLE WOULD CONSIDER THE REFUSAL OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS TO RATIFY THIS AGREEMENT AS CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT OF THE ALLIANCE UNITING IT WITH THE UNITED STATES. ON THE OTHER HAND, IN THE EYES OF TURKEY, THE ASSOCIATION OF POLITICAL CONDITIONS TO THIS RATIFICATION - CONDITIONS HAVING NO RELATION TO THE DEFENSES OF THE TERRITORY COVERED BY THE ALLIANCE - WOULD BE EQUIVALENT TO A REFUSAL OF THE RATIFICATION. THIS REFUSAL WILL CERTAINLY HAVE SHORT

TERM REPERCUSSIONS ON THE LEVEL OF BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN
TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES, LEADING
TO THE IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL FROM THE JOINT
DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS EXISTING ON TURKISH TERRITORY AND THEIR
FINAL CLOSING. THIS SAME REFUSAL WILL ALSO HAVE LESS IMMEDIATE
CONSEQUENCES BUT NONE THE LESS CRUCIAL. DRIVEN TO MAKE
A FINAL CHOICE BETWEEN ITS VITAL NATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND
ITS RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE JOINT DEFENSE OF THE ALLIANCE,
TURKEY WILL THEN BE CERTAINLY OBLIGED TO REVISE ITS DEFENSE
EFFORTS ON THE FRAMEWORK OF THE INTEGRATED MILITARY SYSTEM OF
THE ALLIANCE. SUCH A REFUSAL COULD ALSO HAVE UNFORESEEABLE
CONSDQUENCES IN THE FUTURE BEHAVIOR OF TURKISH PUBLIC OPINION.
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IN FACT, NO TURKSIH GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ABLE TO GUARANTEE
THE REACTIONS OF THE TURKISH PEOPLE WHEN THE LATTER WILL BE
AFFECTED IN THEIR HONOR AND THEIR ATTACHMENT TO THE ATLANTIC
ALLIANCE.

4. TURKEY IS NOE THE LESS CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO ESTABLISH
SOLID AND LASTING NEW RELATINS WITH GREECE. TURKEY HAS NO
TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS IN GREECE. THE MATTER OF THE CONTINENTAL
PLATEAU OF THE AEGEAN DOES NOT CONSTITUTE TERRITORIAL
MATTER FOR EITHER OF THE TWO STATES CONCERNED. ITIS THE SAME
REGARDING THE FIR LINE BETWEEN THETWO COUNTRIES. TURKEY IS
WORKING AT PRESENT TO RESOLVE THESE TWO QUESTIONS THROUGH
NEGOTIATION CHANNELS. SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN THESE TWO
AREAS. THE BERNE AGREEMENT OF 11 NOVEMBER 1976 CONSTITUTES
AN IMPORTANT STEP FOR PERMITTING
THE NOGOTIATIONS TO PROGRESS IN A CALMER ATMOSPHERE.
TURKEY, FOR THE SAME REASON IS ALSO CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO
SOLVE THE CYPRUS QUESTION.

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TURKEY WAS OBLIGED TO INTERVENE MILITARILY IN CYPRUS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 1960 GUARANTEE TREATY. THIS INTERVENTION WAS DECIDED FOLLOWING A COUP D'ETAT PERPETRATED BY THE EOKA - B AND HAD AS ITS IMMEDIATE GOAL THE PREVENTION OF AN ORGANIZED GENOCIDE AGAINST THE TURKISH CYPRIOTS. THIS EVENTUALITY WAS RECOGNIZED BY ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS HIMSELF. IN REALITY, THE TURKISH MILITARY INTERVENTION WAS THE CONSEQUENCE OF A VERY LONG SEQUENCE OF VIOLATIONS OF THE CYPRIOT CONSTITUTION, THE FUNDAMENTAL PROVISIONS OF WHICH WERE AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE CYPRUS REPUBLIC AND THE THREE GUARANTEEING STATES. THIS CONSTITUTION, WHICH ESTABLISHED A BI-COMMUNAL STATE, HAD AS ITS MAIN OBJECTIVE THE GUARANTEE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND OF COMMUNITY RIGHTS TO THE TURKISH COMMUNITY LIVING ON THE ISLAND. THE CYPRIOT GREEKS, FROM 1963 UNTIL JULY 1974, ABOLISHED SUCCESSIVELY ALL GUARANTEES. THE TURKS ON THE ISLAND WERE THE OBJECT OF CONTINUOUS EXACTIONS AND WERE CONSTRAINED TO LIVE ENCLOSED IN SOME HUNDRED ENCLAVES.

THE GREEK CYPRIOT ARMY WAS - AND STILL IS - STAFFED AND COMMANDED BY GREEK OFFICERS APPOINTED BY THE ATHENS GOVERNMENT; AND, ALWAYS IN VIOLATION OF THE 1960 NICOSIA AGREEMENTS, GREECE MAINTAINED UNTIL 1967 A DIVISION EQUIPPED WITH U.S. WEAPONS WHICH WAS ONLY OBLIGED TO EVACUATE THE ISLAND

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ON PRESSURE FROM TURKEY AND THANKS TO THE EFFORTS OF MR. CYRUS VANCE.

HENCE, THE NEW AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE CONGRESS MUST RECOGNIZE THAT JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS ARE NOT ONLY ON THE SIDE OF THE CYPRIOT GREEKS. AN OBJECTIVE AND IMPARTIAL STUDY OF THE ISLAND'S HISTORY IS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THIS. THE TURKISH PEOPLE, THEMSELVES, WILL NEVER ACCEPT TO BE TREATED BY THEIR MOST POWERFUL ALLY AS AN OPPRESSOR, NOR AS A CONQUEROR. FOR THE TURKISH PEOPLE, THE INTERVENTION OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN CYPRUS WAS ONLY AN ACT OF JUSTICE.

TURKEY DESIRES TO FIND A JUST SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS MATTER. IT CAN ONLY BE FOUND IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE CYPRIOT REPUBLIC ENDOWED WITH THE INSTITUTIONS OF A FEDERAL STATE COMPOSED OF TWO FEDERATE STATES, TURKISH AND GREEK.

THE DECEMBER 1975 BRUSSELS AGREEMENT HAVING COME UP AGAINST OPPOSING INTERPRETATIONS OF PROCEDURE, THE CYPRIOT TURKS HAVE NOW TAKEN THE INITIATIVE FOR UNBLOCKING THE PRESENT DEADLOCK, BY PROPOSING A MEETING AT THE SUMMIT BETWEEN PRESIDENT DENKTASH AND ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS. THERE ARE GOOD REASONS TO HOPE THAT THIS MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE. IT COULD PERMIT SERIOUS AND DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS ON ALL THE ASPECTS OF A "PACKAGE DEAL". THE SUGGESTIONS OF THE ALLIED COUNTRIES ON THIS SUBJECT WILL ALWAYS BE WELCOME AND WILL BE EXAMINED WITH THE CARE THEY DESERVE. IF THE TWO COMMUNITIES ARE CAPABLE OF REACHING AN OVERALL COMPROMISE IN THE ABSOLUTE SECRECY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THEIR AGREEMENT WILL HAVE WEIGHT ENOUGH TO KEEP OTHER DIFFICULTIES AWAY.

IN ANY CASE, MY PRIME MINISTER REQUESTS THAT YOU TELL VICE-

PRESIDENT MONDAL THAT HE IS PREPARED TO AID THE NEGOTIATORS UP TO THE LIMIT OF HIS POSSIBILITIES. MY PRIME MINISTER ALSO AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO TELL THE VICE-PRESIDENT THT IF HE COMES OUT THE WINNER IN THE 1977 ELECTIONS, HE WILL SPARE NO EFFORT TO FIND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE A JUST AND HONORABLE SOLUTION TO CYPRUS.

5. THEREFORE, THE REFUSAL OF THE RATIFICATION BY THE AMERICAN SECRET

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CONGRESS OF THE TURKISH AMERICAN DEFENSE AGREEMENT, OR THE ASSOCIATION TO THE RATIFICATION OF THAT AGREEMENT OF POLITICAL CONDITIONS CONCERNING CYPRUS MUST NOT COME TO CREATE A VICIOUS CIRCLE. AMERICAN PRESSURES IN THE AREA OF DEFENSE, INSTEAD OF FACILITATING THE SEARCH OF A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION ON CYPRUS, WILL MAKE IT EVEN MORE COMPLICATED AND DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE. THEY WILL HAVE NO CONSEQUENCES OTHER THAN TO WEAKEN THE TIES UNITING TURKEY TO THE ATLANTIC ALLAINCE AND THE UNITED STATES.

6. THE ELECTIONS WILL NORMALLY TAKE PLACE IN TURKEY TOWARDS THE END OF NEXT OCTOBER. THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN WILL START AT THE BEGINNING OF JUNE. ELEMENTS OF THE EXTREME LEFT WILL ENDEAVOR TO GAIN GROUND DURING THIS CAMPAIGN SO AS TO CUT TIRKEY OF FROM THE ATLANTIC ALLAINCE. ON THEIR SIDE, ELEMENTS OF THE EXTREME RIGHT WILL TRY TO DO THE SAME IN ORDER TO DEAL A FATAL BLOW TO THE TIES TURKEY HAS WOVEN WITH THE WEST SINCE ATATURK. THESE TWO EXTREMES, LEFTISTS AND RIGHTISTS, WERE UNFORTUNATELY FED IN A VERY LARGE MEASURE SINCE 1963 BY THE ERRORS COMMITTED BY THE UNITED STATES IN ITS POLICY RELATING TO THE CYPRUS MATTER. THEREFORE, THE TURK SH-AMERICNN DEFENSE AGREEMENT MUST NOT CONSTITUTE A THEME FOR CONFLICT DURING THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN.

TURKEY, IN PRINCIPLE, HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE TWO AGREEMENTS, THE GREEK-AMERICAN AND THE GREEK-TURKISH ONES, BEING RATIFIED AT THE SAEM TIME BY THE AMERICAN CONGRESS. TO BE CONVINCED OF THIS, IT IS SUFFICIENT TO RECALL THAT TRYING COMMUNIQUE SESSION AT THE LAST COUNCIL AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL. AS FOR THE IMPACT ON TURKEY OF A DOUBLE REFUSAL, THE CONSEQUENCES WOULD NOT BE LESS. WHATEVER GREECE'S REAL INTENTIONS ARE, IT IS CERTAIN THAT IS USES DILATORY TACTICS, LETTING DRAF UNDULY THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ANNEXES TO THE GREEK-AMERICAN AGREEMENT. IN THE PRESENT POLITICAL CONDITIONS, TURKEY CONSIDERS THIS CAN NO LONGER BE TOLERATED AND THAT THE TURKISH-AMERICAN DEFENSE AGREEMENT MUST BE RATIFIED IN TWO OR THREE MONTHS AT THE MOST.END TEXT.STRAUSZ-HUPE

SECRET

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